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Abstract 
 
We analyze the dynamic relationship between financial liberalization and financial 
stability for a panel of 25 developing countries during the period 1986-2010. The 
empirical study employs the Toda and Yamamoto’s (1995) procedure to test for the 
Granger no-causality between six variables of our study including: credit-to-GDP gap, 
deposit to credit ratio, net interest margin , bank supervision, Liberalization measured by 
kaopen and capital control proxied by the Quinn index (2007) . The results show a first 
bidirectional causal relationship between financial stability and deposit to credit ratio, a 
second one between financial stability and capital control and a third one between 
financial stability and liberalization. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the past few years, emerging market economies have witnessed a substantial increase in 
international capital inflows reaching a historical level of $660 billion in 2007. After a sharp 
decline in 2007, the pattern intensified in early 2009 averaging nearly $112 billion per quarter in 
inflows between the second quarter of 2009 and the fourth quarter of 2013 (Lavigne et al.2014). 
The monetary stimulus and the various quantitative programs launched by most central banks in 
developed countries have spurred capital inflows and make it more difficult for emerging market 
policymakers to pursue their internal stabilization objectives. 
However, managing massive capital is not an easy task as they put soaring pressure and could 
even generate crisis. This shows that beyond positive spillover effects of massive capital inflows, 
they could also raise some challenges for policy makers such as their inherent volatility and the 
risk of a disruptive capital withdrawal from EMEs once the process of monetary policy 
normalization in advanced economies commences.  To avoid a scenario similar to the 1997 Asia 
crisis, regulators and policymakers have given a special consideration to improve regulation and 
increase supervision to the banking sector in order to ensure its safety. In this sense, 
Macroprudential policies including monetary, fiscal and exchange policies and other variety of 
actions have been introduced to strengthen the current regulatory framework and to preserve the 
financial sector sound and resilient.  
In this study, we aim at analyzing the dynamic relationship between financial liberalization and 
financial stability for a panel of 25 developing countries during the period 1986-2010. This 
article pays particular attention to the role of capital control since it was perceived as an effective 
policy tool to limit the harmful effects of sudden-stop. It also pays a specific attention to the 
credit boom as it is considered as an important indicator of financial stability (Borio et al. (2002 
et 2009) Mendoza et Terrones (2008)   Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012)).  
 This study is important for developed countries since bank credit has a crucial role in financing 
their short-term investment activity. In this case, a rule that constrains the growth in overall 
credit could entail a welfare cost (Agenor et al, 2013). The empirical stud utilizes a multivariate 
procedure by employing six variables. We employ the Toda and Yamamoto’s (1995) procedure 
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which is a different causality testing to the commonly used methods; i.e. Granger Causality.  
Overall results reveal the existence of three bidirectional relationships: the first one is between 
financial stability and deposit to credit ratio, the second one between financial stability and 
capital control and the third one between financial stability and liberalization. 
     The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two describes the 
methodology and data, section three presents the empirical results and section four concludes. 
2. Data and methodology  
2.1. Data 
We consider the following six variables: credit-to-GDP (FS), deposit to credit ratio (Dep), net 
interest margin (NIM), bank supervision (Sup), Liberalization (LiB) measured by kaopen and 
capital control proxied by the Quinn index (2007). The definitions of the variables as well as 
their sources are presented in Table 1.  
Table1. Definition and sources of the variables 
 Variable
s 
Definition Source 
 
 
FS 
We use the Basel III credit-to-GDP gap to refer to financial 
stability. Credit gap is defined as the difference between the 
credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend (Mendoza et 
Terrones (2008) Gournichas et al. (2001)). Following the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the long-run trend 
be calculated by a one-sided, or ‘real-time’, Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 400,000. 
 
 
 
 
World development 
indicator (WDI) ( 2013) 
Dep 
 
Deposit to Credit ratio.  Financial Development 
and Structure Dataset 
(2013) 
Sup Indicator of banking supervision constructed by Abiad et 
al.(2008) 
Abiad et al.(2008) 
Lib. Indicator of liberalization measured by  
Defacto liberalization = (stock of external assets + stock of 
external Liabilities / GDP.  
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) updated 
to cover the period 
1970 - 2011 
Nim Net interest margin, measured as the total interest received 
minus total interest paid over total interest assets.   
Banckscope publishied 
by Global Financial 
tiLTti
TrendGDPCreditFS
,,
)/( 
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 Development Database 
(GFDD)(2013) 
Quinn 
 
 
This variable is an index constructed by Quinn  to measure 
capital control (see  Quinn, Schindler et Toyoda (2011)) 
 
IMF (2013) « External 
Balance Assessment».          
http://www.imf.org/ext
ernal/np/res/eba/data.ht
m 
 
The sample used includes a sample of 25 developing countries observed during the period 1986-
2010. The list of these countries is presented in Table 2 below. 
 
Table2. Credit boom 
Pays Credit boom 
South Africa - 
Argentina 1989 
Brazil 1989 / 1993 
Chili 2008 
China 2003 
Columbia - 
Costa Rica 2008 
Czech Republic 1993 
Egypt - 
Guatemala - 
Hungary 1990 et 2008 
India 2008 
Indonésie 1997 
Malaisie 1997 
Mexico 1994 
Morocco 1997 
Pakistan - 
Perou 1999 
Philippines 1997 
Russia 1993 
Sri Lanka 1995 
Thaïlande 1997 
Tunisia 1986 
Turkey 1997 - 2010 
Uruguay 2002 
               Source: Author  
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2.2. Econometric approach 
2.2.1.  Panel Unit root tests   
 
The unit root tests are conducted to check for stationarty of the variables in our model. We 
employ the most used tests for panel data analysis; i.e. such as Levin and Chu (LLC, 2002), Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003), ADF PP and finally Breitung (2000). 
 
2.2.2. The Toda-Yamamoto procedure  
 
Toda and Yamamoto employ the basic VAR by the use of a Modified Wald test for restrictions on 
the parameters of the VAR (k) model and estimates a VAR [k+dmax], where k is the lag order of 
VAR and dmax is the maximal order of integration for the series in the system.  This method is 
easy to process and more relevant than the basic Granger test. The multivariate framework of our 
case study can be expressed as follows:  
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
According to Toda and Yamamoto (1995), the estimation procedure is performed in two steps. First, 
we determine the lag length (k) of VAR model and the maximum order of integration (d) of the time 
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series variables in the system. After the selection of optimum lag length VAR (k) and the order of 
integration dmax, a level VAR is estimated with a total of [k+dmax] lags. The second step requests 
the application the standard Wald tests on the first (k) VAR coefficient matrix to make Granger causal 
inference using a chi square (χ2) distribution. 
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Where FS is Financial Stability indicator measured by credit-to-GDP (FS), Dep is deposit to 
credit ratio NIM is net interest margin, Sup is bank supervision, LIB is an index of Liberalization 
measured by kaopen and Quinn is a measure of capital control proxied by the Quinn index 
(2007).  
From Eq. (7) we can test the hypothesis that Deposit to credit ratio does not Granger cause 
Financial Stability (FS) in the following hypothesis: 01120  aH , where 
1
12a is the coefficient of 
Deposit to credit ratio variable in the first line of the matrix displayed in Eq. (7). Additionally, 
we can test the opposite non-causality from Financial Stability (FS) to Deposit to credit ratio in 
the following hypothesis: 01210  aH , where 
1
21a is the coefficient of deposit (Dep) variable in 
the second line of the matrix presented in Eq. (7).We can test the other hypotheses in a same 
manner. 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Panel Unit root tests 
 
To check for the stationarity of the variables, we conduct the Levin and Chu test, (LLC, 2002), the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003)) test, the Fisher-Type test by ADF and PP-test and finally Breitung 
(2000) test. The results are presented in Table 2. They show that the test statistics for the log levels of 
FS, Dep, Sup, Lib, NIM and Quinn, are statistically insignificant. When we apply the panel unit root 
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tests to the first difference of the six variables, all five tests reject the joint null hypothesis for each 
variable at the 1 per cent level. The stationary property of the difference series is thus suitable for 
further statistical analysis with the Granger no-causality test.  Therefore, from all of the tests, the panel 
unit roots tests indicate that each variable is integrated of order one.  
 
Table 3: Panel Unit Root Tests 
  LLC IPS ADF PP BR 
  Level 1
st
 Level 1
st
 Level 1
st
 Level 1
st
 Level 1st 
FS -
5.193 
-
14.187*** 
-8.766 -
14.469*** 
 173.620  
286.283*** 
 
158.737 
 
623.440*** 
0.120 -
5.706*** 
Dep -
2.031 
-8.216*** -0.641 -8.896***  47.176  
176.443*** 
 45.388  
318.278*** 
-0.677 -
4.554*** 
Sup  
0.726 
-3.392***  3.966 -4.151***  13.222  
44.3067*** 
 
17.7252 
 99.951*** -2.408 -
7.255*** 
Lib. -
1.415 
-5.101***  0.351 -8.385***  41.885  
164.470*** 
 54.494  
324.428*** 
 -0.729  -
4.652*** 
Nim -
5.240 
-7.766*** -3.771 -6.573***  94.042  
152.604*** 
 
106.037 
 
302.338*** 
-3.159 -
7.278*** 
Quinn 
 
1.976 
 
-8.359*** 1.2528 -7.46242 
*** 
24.1968 
 
115.219 
*** 
88.6742 
 
682.390 
*** 
0.05988 
 
-5.56350 
*** 
Note: (.) represent p-values.  
*** Denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance 
 
Before proceeding with the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedures we need to determine the 
order of integration of the series (dmax) and the optimal lag length k, in order to avoid spurious 
causality or spurious absence of causality (Clark and Mirza, 2006).  
The result of selecting optimal lag length of VAR indicates that lag order of VAR (k) is 2, for 
multivariate VAR. Now, after, determining the optimal lag length, the next step is to augment the 
VAR by the maximum order of integration of the series (dmax) and then performing the non-Granger 
causality test.  
 
3.2. The Granger non-causality tests 
 
We performed the Toda and Yamamato (1995) procedure to examine the direction of causality.  
The results of these tests are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4:  Results of the TY estimation 
  
FS DEP. NIM Sup Lib Quinn 
FS 
 
Chi-sq - 15.204 7.565 29.754 14.269 8.546 
Prob. - 0.0000*** 0.0228 0.0000*** 0.0008*** 0.0146** 
DEP. 
 
Chi-sq 24.317 - 4.619 3.780 16.411 0.9517 
Prob. 0.0000*** - 0.0993* 0.101* 0.0003*** 0.6213 
NIM 
 
Chi-sq 4.873 12.9148 - 27.906 20.859 85.283 
Prob. 0.0874* 0.0016** - 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Sup 
 
Chi-sq 1.707 6.548 3.667 - 10.142 2.365 
Prob. 0.425 0.0378** 0.100* - 0.0063*** 0.3064 
Lib 
 
Chi-sq 18.362 20.5857 5.8925 0.3408 - 6.048 
Prob. 0.0001*** 0.7461 0.4525 0.8433 - 0.0486** 
Quinn  
 
Chi-sq 6.482 2.769 4.326 0.715 5.556 - 
Prob. 0.0391** 0.250 0.100* 0.699 0.0622* -  
Note: ***, ** and *, denote significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively for rejecting the hypothesis of no-
Granger causality.  
 
We can draw some interesting conclusions from the table above which could be summarized as 
follows. 
First; in the financial stability (FS) equation, all the variables except net interest margin (NIM) act 
positively and significantly at 1% level of significance to financial stability. Therefore we can 
confirm the existence of unidirectional causality running from all the variables except NIM to FS.  
This exception could be explained by the fact that banks desire to have a large net interest margin and 
a high volume of credits.  However in a competitive environment, interest rates are generally low and 
hence NIM is also low. To compensate, banks start exercising high risky activities and this could 
certainly threat the financial stability. However, in developing countries it is possible to see a system 
with a high interest margin and a high volume of credits. In our case study for developing countries, 
NIM does not have any significance on financial stability as the level of competition is very low and 
this could explain why financial sector is underdeveloped.  
The second conclusion to be drawn from Table 3 is the existence of a bidirectional relationship 
between financial stability (FS) and deposit to credit ratio (Dep). This ratio measures the stable 
resources held at banks (core funding) used to allocate credit. Generally speaking, a weak ratio 
reveals a lack of liquidity (Shin and Shin (2011), Hahm et al. (2013)). However, the higher the ratio 
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is the lower banks are exposed to liquidity risk and the higher the financial sector is stable. Similarly, 
we can argue that in a stable financial sector, deposit to credit ratio is always high.  
Another important conclusion is the existence of a bidirectional relationship between financial 
stability (FS) and liberalization (Lib). In fact, following the liberalization of the financial sector to 
international investors, a country can experience a movement of capital flows which in turn could 
influence the credit activities (Calderon and Kubota (2012); Caballero (2012)). In this sense, the 
effects could be positive or negative. In the literature, this relationship provides until today 
conflicting results. In fact, while some other have shown the positive impact of liberalization on the 
stability of the financial sector (Mc Kinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), Goldberg (2004), Mishkin 
(2006)) some other authors showed that financial liberalization exerted harmful effects on the 
banking structure (Carlos Diaz Alejandro (1985), Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)). They 
affirm that the opening of the financial sector to aboard amplified financial instability and increased 
the number of bankruptcies. At this level, Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Fisher and 
Chenard (1997), highlighted the existence of a relation between financial liberalization and banking 
fragility. 
The output of the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) reveal the existence of a unidirectional relationship 
running from Liberalization to NIM. This result is not surprising as the opening of the financial sector 
will accelerate the competition between financial institutions (banks and non-banks) and will lead to 
the decrease of the lending interest rates and revenues which will in turn will decrease the NIM 
(Calderon and Kubota (2009)). 
The results also show a unidirectional causal relationship running from supervision to deposit. This 
show the role of banking supervision in monitoring banks and banking activities and its role to keep 
the financial sector safe and resilient. Finally, Table 6 reveals the existence of bidirectional causality 
between financial stability and capital control proxied by Quinn index. In fact, liberalization and high 
competition have stimulated risk appetite and spur the search for yield. In this situation an effective 
prudential supervision by bank regulators and a good expertise in screening and monitoring 
borrowers would ultimately reduce the risk related to massive capital inflows and would provider 
better control to credit activities.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
In this research paper, we aim investigated the dynamic relationship between financial 
liberalization and financial stability for a panel of 25 developing countries during the period 
1986-2010. We precisely concentrated our attention on the role of capital control as a new 
Macroprudential policy tool. In this paper, financial stability was proxied by credit boom. In fact, 
following the period of massive capital inflows into developing countries, availability of funds 
were followed by boom of credits provided by banks and financial institutions. In this situation, a 
withdrawal of foreign funds could generate a liquidity and credit crises. To curb with this 
scenario, policy makers and regulators have introduced new policy tools to keep the financial 
sector sound. Our empirical analysis shows several important conclusions among them we found 
the existence of a bidirectional relationship between financial stability (FS) and deposit to credit 
ratio (Dep.) and a bidirectional relationship between financial stability (FS) and liberalization 
(Lib). We also found bidirectional causality between financial stability and capital control 
proxied by Quinn index.  These results could be of great interest for policymakers and regulators 
of emerging market economies and developing countries as well to develop their financial sector 
and improve their regulatory framework by taking further steps to limit the spillover effects of 
capital flow volatility and an expected withdrawal of foreign funds.  
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